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Abstract: The EU bilateral trade strategy since 2006, including the TTIP, has 
been justified by the European Commission on the bases that deep and 
comprehensive trade agreements are compatible with efficient multilateralism. 
The Commission argument is the following: in a context marked by international 
supply-chains, preferential agreements that allow for progress on what has been 
achieved at the multilateral level (topics WTO +) and in areas not already 
covered by the WTO (items WTO- X) may be considered as a stepping stone, not 
a stumbling block for multilateral liberalization. In other words, EU recent bilateral 
negotiations and agreements should be seen at worst as complementary to 
multilateral negotiations and at best as promoters. 
This paper challenges this argument by pointing out that the multilateralization 
potential of a bilateral agreement may not be a sufficient condition for 
compatibility between the bilateral and multilateral approaches. Their 
complementarity may also be influenced by what is happening at the multilateral 
level. Content analysis of a primary source of information - the Bridges Weekly 
reports - shows that there has been a change in EU actions in the Doha Round 
towards Brazil, India and China since 2009. Though the EU did not preclude the 
inclusion of these emerging powers in the high table of negotiations at any time 
and was in favour of the Bali agreement of 2013, its willingness to respond to 
their demands reached a plateau in 2008. That may signal a change in the nature 
of its bilateral strategy. Indeed, from 2006 until 2009 the EU may have sought 
bilateral partners among new important trade players (India, ASEAN and South 
Korea) to complement or even facilitate a multilateral agreement. Since then, 
however, the EU may have focused on reaching agreements with even more 
important trade partners: the old Quad members (Canada, Japan and the USA) 
as a way to ensure the market access opportunities that it cannot longer expect 
to obtain from the Doha Round. Following this analysis, the TTIP should be read, 
at least in the short time, as an example of efficient bilateralism. 
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1. Introduction 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)  is part of the maelstrom of 
bilateral trade negotiations that the European Union (EU) has launched since mid-
2000s. There are two major differences between these and other agreements signed in 
the past. The first is that the EU has sought to establish new-generation free trade areas 
with non-European developed countries while its traditional approach was bilateral or 
regional agreements with neighboring and developing countries. The agreement with 
South Korea entered into force in 2011 and, in 2013, the EU reached an agreement with 
both Canada and Singapore and started negotiations not only with the United States 
(US) but also with Japan. 
The second difference is that these agreements represent a change in the trade strategy 
followed by the EU in previous years. From the late 1990s to the mid- 2000s, the EU 
tried to “manage globalization” following the doctrine of the then Trade Commissioner 
Pascal Lamy (Meunier, 2007). It froze the opening of new bilateral or regional trade 
agreements (although it continued with the already initiated) and focused in shaping the 
new multilateral agenda or multilateral round of negotiations, even though the U.S. was 
pursuing a more favorable policy towards bilateral agreements. From the mid -2000s, 
however, both the "Global Europe" strategy promoted by Commissioner Peter 
Mandelson (2004-2008) and the "Trade, Growth and World Affairs” strategy promoted 
by Commissioner Karel De Gucht (2010-2014), recognize the need for the EU to sign 
preferential agreements with key partners (Woolcock, 2012). In the words of Conceição 
-Heldt (2013: 122): "“Officially, multilateralism was the favourite EU trade strategy 
until July 2006”.  
The EU bilateral trade strategy since 2006, including the TTIP, has been justified by the 
European Commission on the bases that deep and comprehensive trade agreements are 
compatible with efficient multilateralism. The Commission argument is the following: 
in a context marked by international supply-chains, preferential agreements that allow 
for progress on what has been achieved at the multilateral level (topics WTO +) and in 
areas not already covered by the WTO (items WTO- X) may be considered as a 
stepping stone, not a stumbling block for multilateral liberalization. In other words, EU 
recent bilateral negotiations and agreements should be seen at worst as complementary 
to multilateral negotiations at the Doha Round and at best as promoters. 
In page 10 of its Communication "Global Europe" of 2006, the European Commission 
specifically states that: 
 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), if approached with care, can build on WTO and other 
international rules by going further and faster in promoting openness and integration, 
by tackling issues which are not ready for multilateral discussion and by preparing the 
ground for the next level of multilateral liberalisation. …To have a positive impact 
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FTAs must be comprehensive in scope, provide for liberalisation of substantially all 
trade and go beyond WTO disciplines. The EU's priority will be to ensure that any new 
FTAs, including our own, serve as a stepping stone, not a stumbling block for 
multilateral liberalisation.  
In its 2010 Communication "Trade, Growth and World Affairs ", the message remained 
the same: “the bilateral is not the enemy of the multilateral. The opposite may hold 
truer: liberalisation fuels liberalisation.” (European Commission, 2010: 5). 
Regarding the TTIP, the US-EU Presidents joint press statement of 13 February 2013 is 
quite clear: “Through this negotiation, the United States and the European Union will 
have the opportunity not only to expand trade and investment across the Atlantic, but 
also to contribute to the development of global rules that can strengthen the multilateral 
trading system” (EU, 2013). The European Commission memo published that same day 
explains that one of the key objectives of the TTIP is to address WTO+ and WTO-X 
areas (European Commission, 2013).  
This paper challenges this argument that EU bilateral strategy in general and the TTIP 
in particular are compatible with the EU leitmotif of efficient multilateralism. It attests 
that the fact that these preferential agreements have the potential to be multilateralized 
is not a sufficient condition for compatibility between the bilateral and multilateral trade 
approaches. By taking into account what is happening in the Doha Round (DR), it 
shows not only that there may be multilateral determinants to EU bilateral agreements 
but also that their compatibility with efficient multilateralism may have changed in 
2009. The article is divided into four more sections. In section two, we recognize that 
the European Commission reasoning is sustained by a large part of the literature.  In 
section three, we justify the interest of adding an analysis of the DR into the equation 
and explain a way to do it. In section four we present the results. We conclude in section 
five.  
 
2. The pillars of the European Commission reasoning  
The line of reasoning of the European Commission is backed by a large part of the 
academia and derives from a debate on the complementarity of bilateral and multilateral 
approaches to trade that has been ongoing since the birth of the multilateral trading 
system after World War II. It is a debate that has been addressed from different 
perspectives by experts in international law and international economic policy as well as 
EU scholars. Most of them agree that both strategies need not be mutually exclusive and 
that a key condition for compatibility is whether preferential agreements have the 
technical capacity to bolster or undermine the WTO.  
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2.1. Bilateralism and multilateralism need not be mutually exclusive 
What is to be a pro-multilateralism actor in the trade arena? If that meant both to be a 
member of the WTO and not having bilateral agreements, only a country or territory in 
the world would meet the definition: Mongolia. Currently all other WTO member 
countries have at least one free trade agreement (FTA) with another member. Therefore 
we can assume from the beginning that you can be an advocate of the multilateral 
system while having preferential trade agreements with third countries. 
 
Indeed, the multilateral trading system established after World War II in the form of the 
GATT agreement contemplated the possibility of breaking with its fundamental 
principle of non–discrimination in certain circumstances. Article XXIV in particular 
allowed for bilateral agreements establishing free trade areas or customs unions. In the 
1970s, moreover, the GATT agreement introduced, as a result of pressure from 
developing countries, the possibility to grant special trade treatment to developing 
countries. 
 
Therefore, the EU having (bilateral or regional) preferential agreements with third 
countries does not automatically mean that it is conducting a trade strategy contrary to 
the multilateral system. According to Pascal Lamy (2013: 29), Director General of the 
WTO in 2005-2013 and Trade Commissioner of the EU from 1999 to 2004, 
“multilateralism is opposed to protectionism not regionalism." However, the multilateral 
system is only willing to accept bilateral or regional agreements if they allow for greater 
trade liberalization. More specifically, these agreements must meet certain conditions to 
be accepted: 1 
 
1) They must affect all commercial exchanges or an "essential" part of them. 
2) In the case of customs unions, the common external tariff should not imply greater 
protection against third countries. If this is so, the union should compensate for the 
added protection with tariff reductions in other tariff headings. 
3) Regional arrangements should be carried out within a maximum of 10 years. 
 
The validity of these conditions has been endorsed by the analysis of the bilateralism-
multilateralism rapport conducted from an economic policy perspective. Economists 
such as Baldwin (1993, 2006, 2013) have argued that bilateralism and multilateralism 
may feedback each other and in fact have done so. This position feeds largely on the 
effects of trade creation that ensue from bilateral agreements and considers that these 
arrangements may be building blocks of multilateralism in the medium to long term. 
Other authors such as Bhagwati (1991, 2008) argue instead that bilateralism can erode 
multilateralism mainly due to trade diversion effects, that is, to the inherent 
discrimination in market access these agreements imply. This view sustains that 
                                                          
1
 Article XXIV taking into account the Understanding signed at the Uruguay Round intended to clarify 
and specify some aspects of the article that had led to controversies and different interpretations.    
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bilateral agreements are stumbling blocks to the multilateral system as such a tangle of 
agreements - ' spaghettis bowls’ - hinder trade. As both positions are based on empirical 
evidence, one can conclude that the nature of bilateral agreements can determine their 
compatibility with the multilateral system: the more trade creation versus trade 
diversion an agreement entails the more likely it is to support the multilateral system 
(WTO, 2011). 2 
So, one way to ascertain that the EU’s bilateral strategy does not run against its pro-
multilateral stance would be to analyze whether its bilateral agreements -signed or in 
negotiation- comply with the rules of the multilateral system. The problem is that such a 
study is very difficult from the moment that there is a legal limbo on this issue 
following the establishment of the EEC as a customs union in 1968 (WTO, 2011). That 
regional economic integration led to disagreements on the method to use for calculating 
the impact of the common external tariff in third countries. Agreement on that was 
never achieved and there exists no formal decision on the compatibility of the EEC with 
the GATT. Although several other preferential trade agreements have been examined by 
GATT working parties since then, only a few have been deemed to be compatible with 
Article XXIV and no agreement has been censured as incompatible with GATT rules. In 
the words of Woolcock (2007: 11): "the scope for different interpretations of Article 
XXIV GATT is such that there is no effective WTO discipline." 3 
 
2.2. Technical capacity to bolster or undermine the WTO 
With the evolution of the GATT to the WTO and the widening of trade liberalization 
scope, doctrine has sought ways to determine whether a bilateral agreement complies 
with multilateral rules in this new framework (Estevadeordal et al, 2013). Starting from 
the basic condition of Article XXIV that bilateral agreements should not hinder 
multilateral achievements, there is some consensus among experts that bilateral trade 
agreements should only enable progress in trade liberalization, never a pull back. So, the 
more a bilateral agreement allows to progress on what has been achieved at the 
multilateral level (topics WTO +)4 and in areas not already covered by the WTO (items 
WTO- X)5, the more susceptible it is not to undermine the multilateral system (Horn et 
al, 2009). 
                                                          
2
 It should be noted that for some authors like Baldwin, trade diversion, that is, any bilateral or regional 
agreement inherent discrimination against third countries, can trigger a domino effect by encouraging 
third countries to participate in the preferential agreement.   
3
 In the DR, the WTO members raised preferential agreements to "systemic problem" or problem that 
affects the entire global trading system and needs to be addressed as such (Estevadeordal et al, 2013). 
However, all that has been achieved in this regard is a DR pre-agreement on a transparency mechanism 
for preferential trade agreements (WTO, 2006).  
4
 For example, the total elimination of tariffs and the liberalization of more trade in services. 
5
 Following the World Trade Report 2011, the main policy areas covered by WTO-X provisions are: 
competition policy, investment, movement of capital and intellectual property rights not covered by 
TRIPS. The next largest group of policy areas are: environmental laws, labour market regulations and 
measures on visa and asylum. 
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Several comparative analyses of EU preferential trade agreements with third countries 
indicate that the EU bilateral agreements would fulfill the requirement of being WTO+ 
and WTO-X (Woolcock, 2007 and 2014; Horn et al, 2009). These studies show that, 
unlike the US, the EU does not have an FTA model. The agreements are adjusted 
according to the partner and, in particular, to the partner’s level of development. 
Moreover, the EU does not use its rules aggressively with developing countries. These 
are asked, at least at first, to implement international rather than EU standards. Finally, 
in recent years, the EU has been including WTO- X items in its preferential agreements 
negotiations with both emerging economies (Chile, South Africa, India and Brazil ) and 
developed countries (USA, Japan, South Korea and Singapore) as well as with its 
traditional partners (new agreements with the countries of the southern Mediterranean).6 
EU FTAs also try to go beyond what has been achieved in the field of services under the 
GATS (WTO+ issues). 
From this perspective, therefore, mega-regional negotiations, including the EU-US and 
EU-Japan ones, could be a step towards the transformation of ' spaghetti bowls ' (chaos 
resulting from many different FTA) into ' lasagna dishes ' (Estevadeordal et al, 2013). 
These would be separate processes from the WTO but complementary in their aim of 
reducing transaction costs inherent to the ' spaghetti bowls '. As Abbott (2007: 582) put 
it: “The WTO might, in effect, ‘free-ride’ on all the PTA activity taking place.” In fact, 
one frequent example to how bilateral agreements can be regionalized and even become 
multilateral is the creation of the Pan-European system of rules of origin in 1997 
(Baldwin, 2013). 7 Following the metaphor, creating lasagna would be a step in the 
development of a multilateral super pizza. 
It is interesting to note, in this sense, that while the TTIP is expected to have a negative 
impact on both the EU and US trade with third countries in the short term; in the long 
term the impact is to be positive thanks to a multilateralization of norms. The 
Bertelsman Foundation commissioned study on the macroeconomic impact of the TTIP 
estimates that EU and US trade with the rest of the world would drop in the short term 
by more than 10% (Felbermayr et al., 2013). The Centre for Economic Policy Research 
study calculates, however, that by 2027 the TTIP would increase GDP in the rest of the 
world by almost €100 billion (compared to €120 billion for the EU and €95 billion for 
the US) (Francois, 2013). This change in the nature of the TTIP impact on the rest of 
world would be the result of positive spillover effects derived from the EU and the US 
developing common regulatory approaches. The economic importance of the TTIP 
market will mean that their trade partners would have an incentive to move towards the 
new transatlantic standards…making it easier to multilateralize them either de jure or de 
facto.  
                                                          
6
 According to Horn et al (2009), however, EU agreements show a significant amount of "legal inflation“, 
i.e. commitments that are not legally enforceable.   
7
 Another way to “multilateralizing” bilateral agreements would be to make them irrelevant by bounding 
"most favored nation tariffs" or WTO tariffs to zero for a set of goods (as the Agreement on Information 
Technology did in 1996). If tariffs are zero for all imports irrespective of origin, granting bilateral or 
regional preferences would no longer make sense. (Baldwin, 2006)  This is in fact the case for nearly 50 
per cent of world trade (Subramaian and Kessler, 2013).  
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This body of literature has of course detractors. Some researchers have argued that these 
mega- regional agreements, for all the WTO + and / or WTO -X topics they may cover, 
can also make the coexistence between the bilateral and multilateral systems more 
difficult, at least in the short term. As Bhagwati (2008: 94-95) remarks: "Lasagna 
cannot be made from spaghetti: it needs flat pasta. And pizza cannot be made from 
lasagna either!" On one hand, these agreements can create new trade diversion effects, 
especially through different norm recognition schemes and a plurality of norms of 
origin (Lawrence, 2013; Subramanian and Kessler, 2013). In particular, countries that 
tend to lose more decision-making power in the context of bilateral negotiations are the 
least economically powerful (UNCTAD, 2014; Bhagwati, 2008; Abbott, 2007). 
Moreover, these agreements can divert multilateral negotiating capacity and create valid 
alternative market access for key economic actors (Conceição - Held, 2013). Last but 
not least, as Dr. Supachai -former WTO director-general (2002-2005) - has recently 
pointed out during an interview,8 they may set-up too forward-looking rules in areas 
that less developed economies would struggle to accommodate. Their impact would 
depend largely on whether they are more or less exclusive towards third countries. 
 
Despite this criticism, however, bilateral agreements have tended to be looked at with 
increasing benevolence. This is in part due to globalization and the emergence of value 
added chains of production. While Director General of the WTO, Lamy (2013) claimed 
that mercantilism was dead because in order to be a competitive exporter a country must 
be a large importer. In a context marked by transnational production chains what was 
needed is a clear regulatory framework in areas such as services and investments. He 
argued that this governance demand was being met by the conclusion of preferential 
agreements. The key condition is that these agreements promote coherence between 
divergent regulatory regimes. In that case, the preferential and multilateral approaches 
would be mutually supportive. This was in fact one of the recommendations presented 
in April 2013 by the reflection group on the Future of Trade established by Lamy in 
2012 (WTO, 2013).9 Regarding the TTIP, an ECFIN Economic Brief (Galar, 2013) 
brings out that the EU exports and imports from the US are higher in value added than 
in gross terms. The author contends that by forwarding the TTIP (and an agreement 
with Japan) the EU would be strengthening global production networks and by so doing 
reinforcing the case for multilateralism (assuming that these would be agreements open 
to new members). 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Business Desk of The New Zealand Herald, “TPP risk weaker world trade system –ex WTO boss”, 21 
July 2014. 
9
 Another group of reflection on how to strengthen the multilateral trading system, The E15 Initiative of 
the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and the World Economic 
Forum, reached similar conclusions in December 2013.  
7 
 
2.3. Equation 1 
The European Commission rationale regarding the affinity of the EU bilateral strategy 
and efficient multilateralism is based on a rich body of research on the effects upon the 
multilateral system not only of preferential tariffs but also of deep integration areas 
regarding non-tariffs barriers and value added chains of production. In other words, its 
bilateral strategy justification, including the TTIP, cannot be accused of lack of 
analytical support.  
The argumentation of this strand of the literature, however, relies upon the potential 
technical feasibility of multilateralization of bilateral or regional agreements. In fact, 
one may argue that for those researchers the main condition for bilateralism and 
multilateralism compatibility is the potential for multilateralization of preferential 
agreements as encapsulated in Equation 1. This is where several questions emerge: Is 
the only issue a technical one? Is it possible that multilateralization does not take place 
despite the fact that bilateral agreements are technically compliant? Can potentially 
compatible regional agreements become stumbling blocks because multilateralization 
does not take place?  
Equation 1 
Bilateral and multilateral trade approaches compatibility = (depends upon) the 
potential for multilateralization of regional trade agreements (the more WTO+ and 
WTO X the more possibilities). 
Some authors have started to put the comprehensiveness of this equation in doubt. Ash 
and Lejarraga (2014: 81), for example, have pointed out: “whether, when, and how to 
multilateralize WTO-plus and WTO-beyond provisions in RTAs is primarily a political 
question…” If the technical condition is not enough:  What other conditions should be 
taken into account? How can we improve this equation? As we already have a condition 
regarding the nature of bilateral agreements, we propose to include a condition 
regarding the nature of the multilateral context, that is, a condition linked to the other 
side of the coin.  
 
3. Including the Doha Round into the equation 
In this section we justify the need to include the multilateral context into the equation on 
which the European Commission reasoning is based and propose a way to do so. The 
former is done by highlighting a less developed body of literature that stresses that the 
multilateral regime may bear on the formation of bilateral or regional agreements. The 
latter is done by defining a new independent variable.   
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3.1. A significant independent variable 
Bergsten and Schott (1997: 3), in their preliminary evaluation of NAFTA, argue that 
“The startup of NAFTA negotiations in 1991 gave renewed impetus to the Uruguay 
Round in the GATT, which had stalled in 1990 because of US-Europe differences over 
agriculture, by reminding the Europeans that the United States could pursue alternative 
trade strategies.” The authors further argue that the congressional passage of NAFTA in 
November 1993 together with the launching of a new era of cooperation via the APEC 
summit in Seattle “played a critical role” in bringing the Uruguay Round to a successful 
conclusion in the following month.  
Some years later, Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003: 829) argued, following a systematic 
approach, that “developments at the heart of GATT/WTO encourage its members to 
form PTAs as devices to obtain bargaining leverage within the multilateral regime”. 
Reciprocal preferential arrangements would both furnish states with insurance against 
the emergence of conditions within GATT/WTO that could threaten their economic 
interests (such as a failure to reach agreement in multilateral talks) and give them a 
greater voice in multilateral trade talks by increasing their market power.  Their 
econometrical analysis indicates that developments within the multilateral regime that 
can create incentives to preferential trade agreement creation include the growth of 
GATT/WTO membership, trade disputes among GATT/WTO members and the 
periodic multilateral trade negotiations sponsored by GATT/WTO.  
Last but not least, Baldwin and Evenett (2011) have recently argued that regionalism 
can be complementary to multilateralism when the multilateral system is active but 
becoming a substitute when the multilateral system is stagnant. In their words:  
... regionalism per se was not the problem. Multilateralism and regionalism have gone 
hand in hand throughout the GATT/WTO’s history. Regional and bilateral 
arrangements were embedded in a vibrant and reactive multilateral system – a system 
that could and frequently did update its disciplines on preferential arrangements. 
Regionalism in a world where multilateralism was permanently deadlocked would be a 
very different proposition – regionalism would begin to act as a substitute to 
multilateralism rather than a complement. ... (Baldwin and Evenett, 2011: 5-6) 
That may be due to the fact that these preferential agreements, by increasing the 
bargaining power of the participants can also made them less willing to make 
concessions. As Conceiçáo-Held (2013: 114) puts it: “the better the outside option of an 
actors, the less dependent it will be on a multilateral trade agreement”.  
In any case, these studies signal that the multilateral context may be a good independent 
variable to add to the compatibility equation for at least two reasons: its lack of 
correlation with the European Commission independent variable and its impact capacity 
on the dependent variable. Regarding the first, any bilateral agreement, including the 
TTIP, could be either a strategy to get an accord at the multilateral level or a substitute 
to the multilateral accord independently of the WTO+ or WTO-X aspects of the 
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agreement. The inclusion of the multilateral context does not predetermine the sign of 
the technical variable; the results of both variables are not necessarily correlated. The 
fact that an agreement is WTO+ and/or WTO-X does not preclude a negative 
multilateral context.  
As to the second, these studies highlight that the multilateral context may be favorable 
or unfavorable to the compatibility between bilateralism and multilateralism. In 
particular, they seem to indicate that the more difficulties at the multilateral 
negotiations, the more possibilities members will negotiate bilateral agreements as a 
strategy to get the accord at the multilateral level or at least as an insurance against the 
round stalling or failing to ensure certain market access results. However, if these 
difficulties are too severe, they may lead towards the bilateral agreements becoming 
substitutes to a multilateral accord.  
Table 1 summarizes this analytical framework using the building and stumbling blocks 
terminology and Equation 2a encapsulates it. Both highlight the importance of being 
able to distinguish between difficulties severity to determine the positive or negative 
impact of this new independent variable to the compatibility nexus. When do difficulties 
at multilateral negotiations become too severe?  
 
Table 1. Link between compatibility (dependent variable) and multilateral negotiations 
(new independent variable) 
 
Equation 2a 
EU bilateral strategy and efficient multilateralism compatibility = potential for 
multilateralization of EU regional trade agreements + difficulties severity in the Doha 
Round (too severe difficulties go against compatibility)  
 
 
 
 
 
Multilateral negotiations 
difficulties 
NOT too severe difficulties Too severe difficulties 
Incentive to bilateral 
agreements 
Bilaterals as building 
blocks for multilateralism 
Bilaterals as stumbling 
blocks to multilateralism 
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3.2. Defining and measuring the new independent variable 
The literature does not provide for a definition of what should be considered too severe 
multilateral negotiations difficulties. Nevertheless, one would expect these difficulties 
to be at least apparent, that is, to be recognized by observers as especially severe, that is, 
as preventing any possibility of agreement in the short or even medium term. In the DR 
case we can find such a period after the 2008 informal ministerial meeting –“the most 
serious attempt to date to bring the negotiations towards finalization” (Ahnlid and 
Elgström, 2014: 81). Though the DR had been declared dead by some analysts at 
different times, it became vox populi after 2008 (Narlikar, 2012; Schwab, 2011). In fact, 
according to Bridges Weekly of 11 January 2012, the Ministerial Meeting of the WTO 
in December 2011 formally concluded that DR was in a "stalemate". Although the 
financial crisis that broke out in 2008 did not challenge the idea that trade should be as 
free as possible (Subramanian and Kessler, 2013; De Ville and Orbie, 2011), the 
difficulty in reaching agreements at the multilateral level put into question the ability of 
the WTO to be effective (Narlikar, 2012; Bhagwati, 2008). It may even be argued that 
the difficulties to enact the mini-package agreement achieved in December 2013 in the 
Bali Ministerial Meeting have not done much good to restore the WTO image (Herwig, 
2013).  Can we therefore consider that since 2009 and at least up until 2013 the DR 
negotiations difficulties were too severe?  
The answer to this key question is not as straightforward as one may think because 
stalemates in multilateral negotiations are not so rare (Herwig, 2013). As most GATT 
rounds have tended to be declared in danger at different points in time and have finally 
led to agreement (Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2003; Cohn, 2002), it is difficult to judge 
the severity of negotiation difficulties on the bases of the number of years without 
progress. It may be that one year of stalemate in the Uruguay Round is equivalent to 
four years in the DR due to the higher number of participants, the scope of the 
negotiations or the impact of the 2009 financial crisis. For this reason, to be able to 
answer this key question we need further evidence that the severity of the negotiation 
difficulties became intense enough at least for the EU.  
To do so, we propose to look at EU reaction to that negotiation juncture. If the 
negotiations difficulties had become too severe, one would expect the EU to react. No 
reaction or change in its DR strategy would be taken as a sign that the difficulties were 
not perceived as too severe by the EU. In that case, the EU would have been expecting 
an agreement at the multilateral level that would have made possible the 
multilateralization of its bilateral agreements (at least in the area of market access), 
reducing the potential trade diversion effects and making its bilateral strategy 
compatible with efficient multilateralism. Alternatively, a reaction or change in the EU 
DR strategy would be taken as a sign that the difficulties had become too severe. In that 
scenario, bilateral agreements after 2009 would have been undertaken without any 
expectation of reaching a multilateral agreement in the short or medium term. If this is 
the case, its bilateral strategy after 2009 may have become a substitute to 
multilateralism. This method is encapsulated in Equation 2b. 
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Equation 2b 
EU bilateral strategy and efficient multilateralism compatibility = potential for 
multilateralization of EU regional trade agreements + EU responses to the stalemate  
in the Doha Round (change goes against compatibility) 
That leaves us with the task to define EU DR Strategy so as to be able to establish 
whether it has changed. To do so we propose to focus on what most analysts consider to 
be the main reason for the DR stalemate: the emergence of Brazil, India and China 
(BIC) as key veto players in the negotiations (Ahnlid and Elgström, 2014; Narlikar, 
2012; Schwab, 2011; Van den Bossche and Alexovicová, 2005; Evenett,  2003). Up 
until 2003, despite concessions to developing countries, consensus building in the 
GATT rounds of negotiations and in the DR  was determined by the US and the now 
EU, along with Japan and Canada, the so called Quad (Ehlermann and Ehring, 2005).10 
In the Cancun Ministerial Meeting of 2003, however, several developing countries, 
under the leadership of India and Brazil, challenged the classic Western leadership in 
the trade arena. Their opposition led to the removal of new topics of interest to 
developed countries from the Round Agenda, the rejection of the agreement on 
agriculture proposed by the US and the EU and to a shift from the Quad to new 
groupings of consensus-building that include the BIC (Garcia-Duran et al, 2014; 
Narlikar, 2011b; Blackhurst and Hartridge, 2004). How did the EU react to the 
emergence of these new key players in the negotiations? Did it oppose or welcome their 
inclusion into the decision-making core? Did it make new concessions to satisfy their 
demands or took a passive role in the negotiations?  Did the EU attitude towards the 
emerging new players change from 2009 onwards?  
Esther Barbé, Oriol Costa, Anna Herranz and Benjamin Kienzle (2014) have designed 
an analytical framework to study how the EU copes with the changing distribution of 
power in multilateral institutions. It assumes that this power shift adversely affects the 
EU and advances that there are two ideal-type strategies that the EU can pursue. The 
first is accommodation: EU policy adjustment seeking compromise with newly 
empowered actors.  The second is entrenchment: maintaining the policy held prior to 
structural change. In our case, as Table 2 summarizes, accommodation would mean that 
the EU is trying to seek compromise with the new actors so that its DR strategy would 
be to welcome their inclusion into the decision-making core and make new concessions 
to satisfy at least some of their demands. Entrenchment, on the other hand, would 
signify that the EU is trying to maintain the old way of doing things so that either it 
does not welcome the new players into the decision-making core or it does not make an 
effort to make concessions so as to foster the negotiations.  
 
 
                                                          
10
 On the formation of the Quad see Cohn (2002). 
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Table 2. EU possible reactions to BIC in the DR 
EU Reaction to BIC DR negotiations 
Accommodation Welcome inclusion of BIC in decision-making core 
AND concessions to at least some of their demands 
Entrenchment  Reluctant inclusion of BIC in decision-making core 
OR no concessions to BIC demands 
 
This analytical framework can help us establish whether there has been a change in the 
way the EU has reacted to the BIC and whether the change took place after 2008. As 
established previously, no change would mean that the negotiations difficulties are not 
perceived as too severe and therefore that EU is expecting a multilateral agreement to be 
reached. In that case, bilateral agreements may be devices to get the accord at the 
multilateral level. For our independent variable to be negative in terms of compatibility 
we should find that there has been a change in the EU reaction to the BIC after 2008. 
Equation 2c encapsulates this proposal.  
Equation 2c 
EU bilateral strategy and efficient multilateralism compatibility = potential for 
multilateralization of EU regional trade agreements + EU responses (accommodation 
or entrenchment) to BIC in the Doha Round before and after 2009 (change goes against 
compatibility) 
 
3.3. Summing up 
We propose to add a new independent variable into the compatibility equation of the 
European Commission: the reaction of the EU to difficulties in the DR negotiations. 
The inclusion of this new variable is justified by a body of literature that indicates that 
there may be a link between multilateral negotiations difficulties and bilateral 
agreements objective. This literature indicates both that difficulties in multilateral 
negotiations lead toward new bilateral agreements and that when these difficulties 
become too severe bilateral agreements become substitutes to the multilateral 
agreement.   
Is this what has happened in the case of the EU? Could it be that its bilateral strategy 
started as complement and then became a substitute? From 2006 until 2009 the EU 
sought bilateral partners among new important trade players (India, ASEAN and South 
Korea). Since then, the EU has focused on reaching agreements with countries which 
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are even more important trade partners (Canada, Japan and the US). Are we talking 
about the same bilateral strategy or has there been a change?  
 
4.  The reaction of the EU to the BIC since 2003 
To carry out this analysis of the EU position versus emerging countries along the DR 
negotiations from 2003 to 2013, we have used a primary source of information: the 
Bridges Weekly reports. This publication of the International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ICTSD) weekly summarizes what happens in the context of 
the WTO on the bases of both interviews with participants in the negotiations and news 
from Reuters and several prestigious newspapers. The account of the negotiations we 
employ for the analysis is entirely based on this source of information. 
 
The narrative indicates that the position of the EU towards emerging countries has gone 
from accommodation in 2004-2008 to entrenchment. As we explain below, though the 
EU did not preclude the inclusion of new actors in the decision-making mechanisms of 
the DR at any time, its willingness to make concessions in negotiations seemed to reach 
its limit in 2008. On the bases of our compatibility equation, this change in attitude 
indicates that the EU bilateral strategy could have also changed in nature: from 
compatible to efficient multilateralism to substitute.  
 
4.1. Decision-making accommodation 
In rounds of international trade negotiations, meetings to negotiate the content and make 
closer the positions are held at two levels: the technical and the political. The first takes 
place at the WTO headquarters in Geneva and is usually carried out by senior officers of 
member countries and / or appointed ambassadors. The second takes place at the level 
of trade ministers who meet in different forums: in the biannual ministerial conferences 
of the WTO and in the so-called mini-ministerials that host no more than 30 countries 
and aim to give political impetus to the negotiations. Generally, mini-ministerials take 
place several times a year in many different scenarios: in Geneva, when the Director 
General considers it appropriate, and in annual international meetings such as Davos, 
OECD, G8, Cairns,11  APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) and, since 2008, the 
financial G20. 
 
The system to reach consensus on these trade negotiations, either at technical or 
political level, is commonly divided into three phases. First, the consensus is sought 
among key market players, i.e. between members of the so-called Quad or mini-groups 
of key countries. The second step is to broaden the consensus to the 20-25 countries 
                                                          
11
 The Cairns Group is a coalition of countries which was born in the Uruguay Round to push for the 
liberalization of agricultural trade. It consists of both developed and developing agricultural exporter 
countries.  
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most affected by the measure through 'green room' meetings.12 Finally, the agreement is 
laid out to the rest of the countries participating in the Round so as to reach a final 
general consensus. Unlike other international economic organizations, these consensus-
building phases are informal. In other words, their existence and composition are not 
determined by any rule or agreement (Blackhurst and Hartridge , 2004). 
Emerging countries were regular participants in the 'green room' meetings before the 
Cancun Ministerial Meeting (Blackhurst and Hartridge, 2004; Watal and Schott, 2000), 
but the transition to the “high table of multilateral negotiations" (Narlikar, 2010: 718) 
occurred only in 2004. As already pointed out in the third section of this article, the 
breakdown of the traditional system of consensus-building at the Cancun Ministerial led 
to the integration of the emerging economies in the decision making core. 
As the Bridges Weekly recounts, it was necessary to agree on some commitments in the 
agricultural area, the cornerstone of the Round, to re-launch the DR negotiations in 
2004. Consensus was generated under the G5, also known as the ' Five Interested 
Parties', which includes the US, the EU, Brazil, India and, the leader of the Cairns 
Group of agricultural exporting countries, Australia. The result of this consensus was 
the so-called July 2004 package. While this pre-agreement allowed the reactivation of 
the DR, it was not sufficient to reach a final deal in 2005 as planned.  
 
Difficulties in reaching agreement have been constant. In the fourteen years since the 
start of DR negotiations, member countries have regularly pledged to end them and 
failed in their objective. Efforts have been made to achieve this goal by modifying 
several times the composition of the consensus groups so as to try to adjust them to the 
progress of the negotiations. 
In 2005, the G5 was still the reference consensus-building core for agricultural issues 
but in September of that year the new Quad made its debut. Composed by the US, the 
EU, Brazil and India, this group received its name in memory of the old Quad (USA, 
EU, Japan and Canada). Soon, however, the G6 appeared, consisting of the G5 
countries plus Japan, to try to reach agreement not only on agricultural products but also 
on non-agricultural ones (NAMA)13. The declaration of the Hong Kong Ministerial in 
2005 had made it clear that results in the agriculture negotiations were contingent upon 
progress on NAMA negotiations as the EU needed to justify its agricultural concessions 
with benefits both in industrial goods and services. 
                                                          
12
 The term 'green room' comes from the color of the walls of the meeting room attached to the office of 
Mr Arthur Dunkel, Director General of the GATT in the 1970s (Blackhurst and Hartridge, 2004). In those 
years, these meetings usually covered less than 8 countries delegations. Although it no longer designates a 
specific physical space, this term is still used to designate informal meetings, now of  20-30 members, 
convened by the Director-General or the President of one of the areas of negotiation, to try reach a 
consensus which can then be extended to the rest of the membership. (Narlikar, 2011b; Schott and Watal, 
2000).  
13
 NAMA (non-agricultural market access) refers to all products not covered by the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture: it includes manufacturing products, fuels and mining products, fish and fish 
products, and forestry products. 
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In 2007, the consensus leadership was assumed again by the new Quad or G4 because, 
by then, the major controversies in agriculture and NAMA were mainly among these 
four countries. It was the failure in 2008 of this four-sided strategy that led to the re- 
integration of more countries into the consensus-building core. Moreover, China joined 
the core of the negotiations that year for the first time, bringing about the G7. This 
strategy was almost successful. Agreement was nearly achieved in both July and 
December 2008. The confrontation between the U.S. and India, with disagreements on 
issues related to food security and the full liberalization of certain industrial sectors, 
prevented it. 
In 2009 the DR dropped into lethargy. Despite commitments to terminate the Round 
both in 2009 and then in 2011, there was no real willingness to negotiate for it. No 
consensus-building core formations were called for; meetings were bilateral or among 
broader groups of countries. In fact, a Plan B was brought forward in 2011: to focus 
negotiations on a mini-package so as to achieve some partial agreements. Two and a 
half years after, that accord was reached in the Bali Ministerial. 
It is interesting to note that, following the Bridges Weekly Reports, Bali negotiations 
were mostly carry out in mini-ministerials and in technical meetings. No meeting of any 
of the mini-groups (Quad, G5, G6, G7 or G8) is accounted for in the Reports. In other 
words, Bali negotiations seem to have skipped the first usual stage in international trade 
negotiations and to have directly gone to the second phase. This is probably due to the 
contents of the negotiations as the focus was on specific topics of especial interest to 
developing and least developed countries. 
In any case, the EU has been a member of all the different consensus-building groups 
created since 2003. Our review of Bridges Weekly reveals that once it had accepted the 
emerging countries as necessary interlocutors in the negotiations after the break in 
Cancun, 14  the EU never opposed to integrating the BIC into the consensus-building 
nuclei; there is no evidence of rejection of this new structure. In the decision-making 
area, therefore, the EU reaction to emerging countries has been one of accommodation 
and thence of recognition of their veto power. 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 According to the Financial Times, Pascal Lamy, then EU Trade Commissioner, declared in December 
2003 that the G20 was a necessary negotiating partner. (FT 14/12/2003).  Formed exclusively of 
developing countries, the G20 was formed to reject the US-EU pact on agriculture presented at the 
September 2003 Cancún Ministerial Conference. Led by Brazil and India, this was the first coalition to 
include China. The original countries of the G20 were: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, 
the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela. Later there were changes in the composition of 
the group: Egypt and Kenya joined, but various South American countries withdrew under pressure from 
the US.  
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4.2. From accommodation to entrenchment in the negotiations 
In the field of the DR negotiations, our analysis of the events through the Bridges 
Weekly indicates that we can distinguish between two different EU positions. The first 
reaction after the Cancun Ministerial was to adapt. Until 2008, the EU offered 
substantial concessions in two areas: the Singapore issues and the agricultural 
negotiations, so as to allow for progress at the DR. From 2009 until 2013, however, the 
EU adopted a position of entrenchment: it was unwilling to offer new concessions 
thereby accepting the risk of the DR stalling. 
After the failure of the Cancun Ministerial in September 2003, the EU took a time-out 
to decide on whether to agree to the demands of other WTO partners, especially of the 
emerging countries, so that the round could continue. It formally adopted its new 
position on December 8 of that year following a statement by the European Commission 
adopted in November 2003: “…the EC remains committed to the multilateral trading 
system and will engage in re-launching talks, with the expectation that other parties 
show flexibility to negotiate and go beyond initial positions...“ (Bridges Weekly Vol. 7, 
No. 40, 26/11/2003). By so doing, the EU accepted both that most of the Singapore 
issues might be dropped from the negotiating agenda and that it should make further 
concessions on agricultural issues to allow for progress at the DR. This commitment, 
together with the one of the US in January 2004, cleared the way for resuming the DR 
negotiations. 
The intention to wrap up the DR was renewed each year from 2004 to 2008. In most of 
these negotiation developments, the EU had to make concessions so that the process 
could continue. These concessions are summarized in Table 3 taking into account that 
agricultural negotiations are structured in three axes: market access (tariffs and quotas), 
domestic support and export subsidies. It should also be noted that it was widely 
accepted that the outcome of the round was contingent upon a “triangle of issues” 
(Bridges Weekly Vol.10, Nº 19, 31/5/2006):  EU efforts in agricultural market access, 
US efforts on domestic farm subsidies and emerging powers efforts regarding tariffs on 
industrial products.  
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Table 3. EU concessions in the DR negotiations 2003-2013 
Year Concessions 
2004: July 
Package 
The EU accepted to remove all or some of the Singapore issues from the 
Agenda and to eliminate export subsidies for agricultural products 
(although without a deadline). Finally, Trade Facilitation was the only 
Singapore theme included in the DR Agenda.  
 
2005 
Hong Kong 
Ministerial  
The EU accepted 2013 as the deadline to remove export subsidies for 
agricultural products. 
 
2006 The EU agreed to reduce tariffs on agricultural products by 46 %. It was 
a percentage close to what the BIC were demanding (54%) but far away 
from what the US requested (75%). 
 
2007 Resistance by both the EU and US to expand their concessions in 
agriculture but eventually both expressed their willingness to do so:  the 
EU regarding tariff reductions and the US in relation to domestic 
support. 
 
2008 The EU accepted to reduce its agricultural tariffs at the level requested 
by the BIC and to cut down domestic agricultural support by 80%. 
Agriculture negotiations were almost completed but differences between 
the US and India on a topic related to food security and rural 
development prevented the deal. 
 
Source: Bridges Weekly 2004-2008.  
 
One can debate the degree of generosity of the EU negotiating positions but one can 
hardly question that they implied concessions, at least from the point of view of the EU. 
In fact, as recounted in Bridges Weekly, concessions in agriculture were made at the 
expense of great internal tensions within the EU. France led a strong opposition to all of 
them, accusing the European Commission of lack of mandate to perform, and tried 
unsuccessfully to achieve a blocking minority to prevent them: 
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In a further complication to a potential accord, however, nine EU countries, led by 
France and Italy, formed a coalition on Monday to push for better terms in a Doha 
Round deal, Reuters reported. EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson has 
maintained that he has the support of EU member states in the negotiations, but the 
creation of the new alliance could nonetheless undermine his credibility at the 
talks.(Bridges Daily Update of July Negotiations, nº 9, 29/7/2008) 
2008 was the year a final deal was almost attained. It was also the time when the EU 
made clear that it had reached its negotiating limit: it would offer no more concessions 
in the agricultural field. To advance the negotiations other actors should make more 
efforts. As publicly acknowledged by the then Trade Commissioner De Gucht, at a 
conference at the London School of Economics in March 2010, the EU no longer had 
domestic political support to go beyond (Bridges Weekly, Vol. 14, No. 11, 24/3/2010). 
 
True to its avowal, the EU has not made any concessions in the negotiations since 2008. 
It should be noted, however, that it has always tried to facilitate meetings and potential 
agreements between other international actors.15 In truth, the 2013 Bali mini-package 
was the result of a European proposal. As soon as 2006, the then EU Trade 
Commissioner Mandelson recommended to close some deals on issues that favored 
developing countries and especially the least developed, so as to make some progress in 
the DR and to prove the pro-development nature of the negotiations. This idea began to 
take shape in the WTO as a real plan B in 2011, in a context of negotiation fatigue.  
This EU mediation or even leadership in the mini agreement is consistent with its 
traditional attitude towards multilateralism. Nevertheless, it does not imply 
accommodation from our analysis perspective because it did not signify any additional 
concession. Indeed, despite the pressures, the EU did not agree to include in the Bali 
package its previous commitment to eliminate export subsidies by 2013. It argued that 
this was part of its concessions for a global agreement on the DR.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
The European Commission has repeatedly argued since the mid-2000s that bilateralism 
and multilateralism need not be mutually exclusive and that the key condition for 
compatibility is whether preferential agreements have the technical capacity to bolster 
or undermine the WTO. As EU new bilateral agreements allow for greater trade 
liberalization than the existing multilateral accords they can be seen as a form of 
enhanced cooperation in trade that would later on be susceptible of multilateralization. 
This paper has not disputed that claim. On the contrary, it has recognized that it is based 
on a solid research body and that the WTO+ and WTO-X nature of the agreements 
                                                          
15
 Ahnlid and Elgström (2014: 87) allege that the EU role in the negotiations changed at the end of the 
2008 meeting: “becoming more a mediator than a leader”. 
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should be taken into account to establish the compatibility of bilateral and multilateral 
trade approaches. 
This paper however has challenged the comprehensiveness of the European 
Commission argument. It has argued that the potential for multilateralization of regional 
trade agreements is not a sufficient condition for compatibility and proposed a new 
independent variable to complete the analytical equation: difficulties severity in the 
multilateral negotiations. This variable is based on the idea that difficulties in 
multilateral negotiations lead toward new bilateral agreements as a strategy to get the 
accord at the multilateral level but when these difficulties become too severe bilateral 
agreements may be a way to substitute the multilateral agreement and ensuring new 
market access.   
To establish whether the stalemate of the DR since 2009 can be considered to represent 
too severe difficulties from the perspective of the EU, we have used a proxy. We have 
looked at whether the EU has changed its actions at the DR from that moment in time, 
that is, at whether there has been a change in EU responses (accommodation or 
entrenchment) to BIC in the DR before and after 2009. According to the results, there 
has indeed been a change in the EU strategy towards the new trading powers. Until 
2008 the position of the EU can be considered accommodative to the new trading 
powers. From 2009 onwards, however, the attitude of the EU in the Doha negotiations 
shifted to entrenchment. Having exhausted its scope to negotiate in agriculture in 2008, 
the EU has not offered more concessions at the multilateral level.  
From the viewpoint of the compatibility equation, these results indicate that EU bilateral 
agreements initiated in the twenty-first century can be justified from the perspective of 
the multilateral system until 2008. The latest EU bilateral agreements or negotiations, 
however, would be read as substitutes to a multilateral strategy. In other words, 
potential free -trade agreements with Japan or the US would hardly be defensible from 
the point of view of effective multilateralism, at least in the short term. Through these 
bilateral agreements, the EU would be looking for the market access opportunities that 
it used to obtain from multilateral agreements and that have become even more 
important in a context of economic crisis. Hence instead of efficient multilateralism the 
main aim of the EU would be efficient bilateralism. 
Anecdotal evidence lends support to our hypothesis that the nature of EU bilateral 
strategy has changed.  Since 2006, the EU reaction to difficulties in the DR seems to 
have been the same: bilateral agreements.  Yet from 2006 until 2009 the EU sought 
bilateral partners among new important trade players (India, ASEAN and South Korea). 
Since then, the EU has focused on reaching agreements with the old Quad members 
(Canada, Japan and the USA) which are even more important trade partners. Moreover, 
these results are in line with the conclusions reached by some authors (Siles-Brügge, 
2014; De Ville and Orbie, 2011) that policy-makers in DG Trade at a time of economic 
crisis are being more sympathetic to the arguments of exporters than import-
competitors. They are also in alignment with recent research on how the reciprocity 
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agenda of the EU, recognized in 2006 by the European Commission in ‘Global Europe’, 
varies depending on the degree of economic development of the partner. Following 
Woolcock (2014), the market access interests play less of a role the less developed the 
partner the EU deals with and vice-versa.  
It may be that this new bilateral strategy would lead towards a multilateral agreement in 
the medium to long term by provoking a domino effect. The danger of the old Quad 
partners establishing a preferential market through bilateral agreements may lead the 
new trade veto players to lower their expectations and facilitate a multilateral 
compromise. But this may also not happen. By opening these negotiations or signing 
these agreements the EU has taken the risk of endangering the multilateral system.   
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